From e4a4b2ae8b70aba68d6858a351552da0655ab8b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexander Monakov Date: Mon, 7 Aug 2023 18:18:13 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] seccomp: remove prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE) snake oil Making the process "not dumpable" has the following effects: * core dumps are not produced * ptrace-attaching to this process is disallowed * files in /proc/ become owned by root Hence, it doesn't contribute to seccomp's goal of preventing attacks via a hijacked 'file' process, and instead limits the ability to observe a running (or crashing) 'file' program, which is not a goal here. --- src/seccomp.c | 6 ------ 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/seccomp.c b/src/seccomp.c index 87d4c49e..26bcbed4 100644 --- a/src/seccomp.c +++ b/src/seccomp.c @@ -68,9 +68,6 @@ enable_sandbox_basic(void) if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) == -1) return -1; - if (prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0) == -1) - return -1; - // initialize the filter ctx = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW); if (ctx == NULL) @@ -158,9 +155,6 @@ enable_sandbox_full(void) if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) == -1) return -1; - if (prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0) == -1) - return -1; - // initialize the filter ctx = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_KILL); if (ctx == NULL) -- 2.32.0